Uncategorized Archives - Page 3 of 4

Private health insurance exchanges and defined contribution: thoughts on Wellpoint’s acquisition of Bloom Health

Tory Wolff September 23, 2011

Why would a health plan want to buy an exchange? Isn’t the only synergy if the owning plan tilts the exchange in their products favor? And won’t that damage the value proposition of the exchange for buyers and see them flock elsewhere? To understand the Bloom Health acquisition, it is important to recognize that the private health insurance exchange (PHIX) space is quite fluid, consisting of three or four distinct market opportunities. (The fourth — capabilities resell — might not really qualify as a PHIX specific opportunity, it is more

The Steward-Tufts deal and the looming threat of provider-led narrow network insurance

Tory Wolff September 16, 2011

The Stewards-Tufts deal announced today will create a narrow network insurance product targeting the small group segment. As reported, members covered by the plan must get all routine care from Steward providers except for complicated procedures and when authorized by a Steward physician. In return, premiums should be 15-30% below other products. Tufts and Steward will share the premiums. Some local market context: Steward Health Care is owned by Cerberus Capital Management is the only major for profit system in the market. The deal follows at the heels of a

A gradual roll-out of ACOs will minimize disruption and resistance

Tory Wolff September 13, 2011

Part of the theory of ACO value creation is trading off more primary care (resulting in better care coordination, fewer missed time bombs, and use of lower cost care options) against reduced use of specialists, ERs and hospitals (few stays, shorter stays). Early results seem to describe substantial promise (although not for everyone who tries the model). Let’s assume this promise will be realized in broader roll-out for the purposes of this post. One fear that is ACOs will drain volume away from unaffiliated medical specialists and hospitals, leading to

Upping in ante in Pittsburgh: the health information exchange arms race

Tory Wolff September 8, 2011

A few weeks ago, UPMC announced an agreement among nine area systems to spend $4M over the next two years to launch a health information exchange called ClinicalConnect. Reportedly, Highmark (and presumably the West Penn Allegheny hospital system it is in the process of purchasing) requested to be a part of the initiative but was refused. Building electronic connections across hospitals – particularly between community systems (such as the non-UPMC participants in ClinicalConnect) and tertiary centers such as the UPMC facilities – helps make transitioning patients easier by making full

Provider incentives in the commercial ACO: retaining a small share of savings in return for future volme growth

Tory Wolff August 24, 2011

Earlier this month, Blue Shield of California announced 2010 results from an ACO partnership with the Catholic Healthcare West hospital system and Hill Physicians. The ACO achieved savings of $20M on a CalPERS population of 41.5K commercial and Medicare lives (where Blue Shield was the secondary payer) — $480 per person or 13% of sponsor costs (average sponsor premium contribution estimated at $3,735 based on press report that $15.5M equaled to 10% of premiums). These results appear to be significantly better than the results of the Medicare Physician Group Practice

Partners’ acquisition of Neighborhood Health Plan: reinforcing the role of community health centers in the care continuum

Tory Wolff August 18, 2011

Much of the public speculation (for example here and here) regarding the acquisition of a local high quality safety net health plan — is it about locking in Medicaid volume? or about doing a “good deed” before regulators make decisions about Partners market influence? – is not very persuasive. Partners is already under intense scrutiny — a program of pushing Medicaid volume to its own facilities would contradict its public promises, exacerbate regulator suspicion and not be very profitable anyway. And if regulators believed Partners has the market power to

The curious absence of payers in public HIEs

Tory Wolff August 12, 2011

Last week, the National eHealth Collaborative published a study of sustainability strategies for 11 leading health information exchanges (actually 12 including the VA). I’ll call these public HIEs to distinguish them from private HIEs – proprietary exchanges among a select group of providers such as an integrated delivery system. Remarkably, payer funding has a relatively small role across the sample: Only 3 report payer funding as an essential part of their current revenue model: Availity (a joint venture among major Blues and Humana), the Rochester RHIO and the Quality Health

Medicaid going mainstream: thoughts on the IBC / BCBSM / AmeriHealth deal

Tory Wolff August 10, 2011

Historically Blues have shied away from Medicaid. Two thirds of plans do not serve any Medicaid and those that do often have disproportionately small shares. No real surprise: Medicaid specialist plans can fluidly move in and out of markets depending on the rates and redeploy their capabilities wherever are the best returns. Blues on the other hand, are prime “hold-up” targets because they are largely stuck in their assigned states. They can only respond to an offer of low rates with a threat of dismantling their Medicaid operations entirely (and

ESRX-MHS Part 2: mail facility speculations (…or: Indulging my Inner SWAGer)

Tory Wolff August 1, 2011

Summary ESRX was running at close to maximum capacity at its mail facilities while MHS has room to spare. ESRX is facing a scenario of significantly increased demand as greater mail penetration is achieved in the Wellpoint book and lacked the capacity to meet this demand. Similarly, ESRX would not be able to meet increased demand from reform coverage expansion. By combining, ESRX avoided having to build a new facility and the combined entity appears to have enough capacity to close at least one older mail facility. Given that a

ESRX-MHS Part 1: Last stand of the PBM pure play: observations on the Medco-Express combination

Tory Wolff July 29, 2011

UNH’s decision to take the commercial PBM business in-house did not force MHS into ESRX’s arms: I would argue that it removed the major roadblock to what the companies wanted to do anyway. MHS and ESRX had been talking about a merger off and on for few years (per WSJ reporting) and the logic (laid out below) is compelling but FTC concerns must have kept getting in the way. UNH’s decision doubled the size of its PBM subsidiary in terms of lives (somewhat less in terms of scripts because the

Consumerism bulk-up: Quick thoughts on Aetna’s acquisition of PayFlex

Tory Wolff July 20, 2011

Payflex is an administrator of account-based benefits including HSAs, HRAs, FSAs and COBRA benefits. The company has $58M in revenues, 1M individual consumer accounts and 3,300 employer customers. On Monday, Aetna accounced plans to acquire the company for $202M. The acquisition pricing looks rich relative to the other benchmark out there: Wageworks is a competitor about 2x the size of Payflex and which recently filed an IPO to sell 23% of the company for $75M (in the works at least since April and described in detail in the registration statement

Highmark and West Penn: it’s about mitigating consolidation, not transforming the system

Tory Wolff June 30, 2011

Highmark will invest up to $475M in the West Penn Allegheny Health System, a move characterized as a prelude to purchase. This is no bold move to drive closer integration of information flows and care decisions or align incentives in a transformative vertically integrated model. My take: this is about desperately propping up the last competing provider standing in a highly concentrated hospital market. Highmark’s hand was forced by West Penn’s financial bleed out. But, in response, UPMC has thrown down the gauntlet in a move that will reshape the

Did Wellpoint overpay for Caremore? No….not yet anyway

Tory Wolff June 28, 2011

Summary Wellpoint probably paid full value for Caremore (if that company’s performance is as powerful as limited data suggests) but did not overpay. In addition, Caremore offers several powerful upsides if Wellpoint can continue to grow the model. However, Wellpoint will need to tread carefully to avoid damaging its purchase, given an uncertain record with vertical models (NextRx) and the inherent challenges in integrating fast-growing, PE-fueled innovators into large, mature businesses. Some indicator of Wellpoint’s strategy for Caremore will be given by its approach to Arizona — a key market

Blue Shield of California’s unilateral profit cap: competitive gambit or PR move?

Tory Wolff June 9, 2011

Summary: Blue Shield of California (BSC) has committed to keeping profits at 2% of revenues or less (and returning any excess). The commitment is economically meaningful: $180M of 2010 revenues will be returned; just a few years ago, BSC made 4.9% net income and, under its promise, would have had to return 2.9% of revenues. However, given BSC’s very large reserves, it has plenty of capital to fund investments or, if necessary, absorb losses. While the PR aspects of the move are interesting, it seems unlikely that this is an

Employer opt-out as a result of reform: survey vs. model

Tory Wolff June 7, 2011

Yesterday, McKinsey released a report suggesting that 30% of employers will definitely or probably stop sponsoring health insurance after the Federal reform “big bang” in 2014. Although disputed by the White House per press reports and the methodology details are limited in the published article, there are four good reasons to think the McKinsey survey could be correct: Contradictory studies (Urban Institute in January 2011 and RAND in April 2011) use simulation methodologies while McKinsey did a survey. With a change as transformative as Federal health care reform, simulation parameters

Rapid shift to “bare bones” coverage among Massachusetts small employers: preview of Federal reform impact?

Tory Wolff June 2, 2011

Summary Massachusetts small group went from an average actuarial value (share of expected medical costs covered by the benefit) of 85% in Q1-07 to 73% in Q4-09. In the same timeframe, actuarial benefit levels in another state for which we could find data (Wisconsin) held steady. Given that this trend was well underway in 2007/08, only a portion of the change can be attributed to the economy. The rest may well be a result of 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform. If true, back-of-the-envelope analysis suggests 50-70% of the decline in actuarial

Rise of self-insurance in smaller groups: opportunity and threat

Tory Wolff May 26, 2011

Summary Self-insurance is growing among smaller groups (including those sized 50-250) From a competitive point of view, it will be hard for insurers holding attractive groups in risk products to respond given the enormous profit cannibalization of converting from risk to an ASO offering But they will need to find some solution: risk products today are expensive for many groups given continuing low levels of utilization; “peanut-butter” share nationals at the forefront of these products (Cigna and now Aetna) won’t have cannibalization worries to stop them from pushing the model

Major health plan Q1 earnings: Profit surprise in commercial risk; multiple reasons why business prospects look good

Tory Wolff May 21, 2011

Public health insurers startled the market with earnings ~25% above consensus expectations. A key driver was lower-than-expected utilization (particularly in the under 65 commercial lives) which kept medical costs down. Management teams offered two theories in the analyst calls: bad weather and the beginning-of-the-year reset of consumer directed (CD) deductibles; neither is compelling: A lot of discretionary care has already been squeezed out of the system by the bad economy; it is hard to imagine that bad weather would drive out a lot more. Also the utilization decline was concentrated

ACO profitability: Reasons for optimism

Tory Wolff March 29, 2011

Summary A new article in the NEJM suggests ACO economics will be unattractive because of the costly upfront investment and low probability of shared savings payments. However, the results of the Medicare Physician Group Demonstration project show good earnings potential for providers (average >$5K per physician). Further: best-practice sharing, emerging narrow networks and scalability of ACO capabilities are likely to significantly enhance ACO economics for providers. It is likely that the most adept providers will be the ones forming ACOs; given delivery system capacity constraints, however, providers opting out of

Primary care capacity and the looming Medicaid surge: Medicaid-focused providers must be part of the answer

Tory Wolff March 21, 2011

Summary A new study from Center for Studying Health System Change suggests that new Medicaid eligibles under reform will have trouble getting access because most primary care are not accepting new Medicaid patients. Our view: The study does not take into account the role of focus in Medicaid which makes a big difference: Providers earning more than 25% of revenues from Medicaid are much more willing to take on all or most new patients. In fact, among the providers most likely to care for Medicaid eligibles, the willingness to accept

Category: Uncategorized

Recon takes an analytical look behind select developments in healthcare